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The Impact of the Continental Can Case
On Combinations and Concentrations
Within the Common Market
By JAMES D. HURWiTZ*
M ULTINATIONAL corporations now account for 15 percent of the
gross world product.1 Not only may these enterprises be far larger
economically than the countries in which they operate, but they also
can move resources, operations and capital across national frontiers
with a flexibility not available to governments. Divisions and subsidi-
aries of a multinational corporation can collaborate in many ways that
are forbidden to separate enterprises. In this way, they are able to
secure the most favorable mixture of political co-operation, currency
stability and lenient tax and corporation laws as well as to resist efforts
of single governments to regulate commerce and finance within national
borders. Whether for good or evil, the widely reported impact of mul-
tinational corporations has been immense.
During the 1890's and the first two decades of the present century,
the concern over large economic concentrations in the United States
was due not to the world impact of the concentrations but rather to
effects on local and national competition and politics. By the time the
European Coal and Steel and the European Economic Community
* J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1972; LL.M., London School of Eco-
nomics, University of London; Member of California Bar. The author would espe-
cially like to thank Mrs. V. Korah, University College, London, for her help and sug-
gestions regarding preparation of this paper, Dr. A. Gleiss for providing a copy of his
statement before the Court, Mme. Espion of the EEC Commission for her helpful
discussion of many of the topics in this paper, and Mr. P. Raul-Duval for translating
some important materials.
1. Ruby, Global Companies: Too Big To Handle?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1972,
at 96. The article cited an estimate that approximately 4,000 companies met the three-
pronged test it was using to define multi-national company. The three requirements
were sales above $100,000,000, operations in a minimum of six countries, and over-
seas subsidiaries accounting for 20 percent or more of the company's world assets. To-
tal world sales of these multinationals increased from $200 billion in 1960 to $450
billion in 1971.
[469]
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Treaties (hereinafter referred to as the Paris and Rome Treaties, respec-
tively) were drafted, the parties were aware, particularly from the
United States' experience, of the power of large enterprises to restrict
international as well as national commerce.' The parties further real-
ized, from wartime experience with the German coal and steel indus-
tries, that these concentrations would have to be controlled. This reali-
zation, combined with experiences of member states and of the United
States in controlling restrictive practices of dominant enterprises and
national and international cartels,3 led to the controls found in Articles
65 and 66 of the Paris Treaty' and 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.'
The merger boom of the 60's6 and the wave of outside investment
in Europe, however, had not yet occurred. Especially in Europe,' nei-
2. The signatories to the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity were the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the French Republic, the Ital-
ian Republic, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Paris Treaty). Treaty Instituting the
European Coal and Steel Community, done at Paris, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
The treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), signed by the sig-
natories of the European Coal and Steel Community treaty, was signed in Rome, Italy
on March 25, 1957 (Rome Treaty). Treaty Instituting the European Economic Com-
munity, done at Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. (This article will use the
translation contained in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 161 et. seq. as this is the text
used by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities). These
two communities plus the European Atomic Energy Community, created on March 25,
1957, done at Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, were merged under the Treaty Establishing
a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, signed in
Brussels, Belgium on April 8, 1965. For text see 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 5115.
3. COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST, 152 n.3 (J. Rahl ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Rahi]. Rahl makes particular mention of the huge international
steel cartel which flourished prior to World War I.
4. For the provisions of Articles 65 and 66 of the Paris Treaty see note 59
infra.
5. For the pertinent provisions of Article 85 see notes 86 & 111 infra. For
Article 86 see text accompanying note 37 infra.
6. Owen, Mergers: Commercial Logic and the Public Interest, The Financial
Times (London), Nov. 23, 1972. In 1960 in Great Britain there were 739 mergers
valued at £ 358 million. Estimated figures for 1972 are 1100 mergers valued at £ 2
billion. The method of valuation was not stated.
Markert states that in the United States mergers rose from just over 200 in 1950
to 2,268 in 1968 in mining and manufacturing industries. He also cites a statement
of Professor Houssiaux that mergers and joint ventures in the Common Market rose
from 273 in 1963 to 670 in 1967. Markert, Antitrust Aspects of Mergers in the EEC,
5 TEXAS INT'L L.F. 32 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Markert].
7. Owen, American Companies in Europe-An Uneasy Partnership, The Finan-
cial Times (London), Dec. 11, 1972, at 14, col. 3. Owen cites U.S. Commerce De-
partment statistics which show that American investment increased between 1960 and
1970 from $2,200 million to nearly $5,000 million in the United Kingdom, from $1,500
million to more than $7,000 million in the Common Market, and from $200 million
to $1,600 million in the rest of Europe.
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ther the impact of multinational enterprises nor the deleterious effects
of changes in an industry's structure due to an otherwise unobjection-
able merger had been studied very extensively.3 Although these were
post-treaty problems, they were problems with which the European
Communities and especially the European Economic Community
(EEC) would have to deal. In an important sense, they provide an
early test of the viability of a legal-economic structure and how well
it can deal with situations only vaguely foreseen by the creators of that
structure. In 1965, the EEC Commission (hereinafter referred to
as the commission) declared that mergers were covered by Article 86
of the Rome Treaty but were not within the scope of Article 85 of
that same treaty;9 however, the arguments continued without resolution.
It was in this climate that the commission in December, 1971, and the
European Court in February, 1973, issued their decisions in the case
of Continental Can.10
The Court's decision has been described by The Times (London)
as "arguably the most important test case in EEC legal history."'
The most spectacular holding of the case is that a merger, otherwise
blameless and directly affecting only the structure of an industry as op-
posed to directly harming consumers or competitors, may nonetheless
be considered an "abuse" and within the proscription of Article 86 if
the article's other requirements are satisfied. Although the Court sup-
ported the commission's basic legal position, it did not feel that the
commission had proved the existence of these other elements; therefore,
the Court refused to condemn the specific merger before it. At the
8. C. EDWARDS, CONTROL OF CARTELS AND MoNOPoLiES: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON 177 (1967) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS]. According to Edwards, in
Europe national control of dominant enterprises generally was weaker, less rigorously
enforced and occurred later (mostly in response to the growth of multinational cor-
porations) than other kinds of competition policy.
9. Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market: Memorandum of the
Commission of the European Economic Community to the Governments of the Mem-
ber States, CCH COMMON M'r. REP,. No. 26 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Concentration
Memorandum].
10. Commission Decision of December 13, 1971 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, L7 E.E.C. J.O. 25 (1972), 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
ff 9481, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 316 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Commission
Decision]. Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v. EEC Comm'n, 2 CCH CoMM.
MKT. REP,. 8171, at 8280 (1973) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter cited as Court
Decision]. All quotations are taken from this translation. For another translation
which includes the submissions of the Advocate General see 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
199 (1973).
11. Cross, Continental Can wins European Court Appeal against Commission,
The Times (London), Feb. 22, 1973.
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close of the case, both Continental Can Company and the commission
were rightly claiming victories because each had won what it had most
sought. It is clear that to reach this position the Court had to weigh
considerations of law and policy crucial to the functioning of the Com-
mon Market. The purpose of this paper will be to review those con-
siderations to see what remains undecided and what trends of future
law and policy can be discerned.
Facts of the Continental Can Case
Continental Can Company is the world's largest manufacturer of
metal containers and is also an important producer of paper and plastic
containers as well as of machines for making, filling and closing con-
tainers. In February, 1969, Continental obtained control of Schmal-
bach-Lubeca Werke (hereinafter referred to as SLW) and by the end
of that year owned over 85 percent of that company's shares. SLW,
heavily concentrated in Germany, is continental Europe's largest pro-
ducer of light metal containers. 2 In late 1969, Continental agreed
with the British company, Metal Box, Europe's largest manufacturer
of metal containers, to establish a joint holding company for Metal
Box's and Continental's combined European interests. Continental was
to have majority control of the resulting company. Toward this end,
Continental created an American holding company, Europemballage,
with offices in New York and Brussels. The agreement with Metal
Box was that Continental would contribute to Europemballage its 10
percent holding in Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa (hereinafter referred
to as TDV), the largest producer of metal containers in the Benelux
countries," its 86 percent holding in SLW, and its 1.3 percent holding
in Superbox, a subsidiary of Metal Box and Italy's largest producer of
metal containers.' 4 Metal Box would contribute to Europemballage its
9 percent holding in TDV, its 93 percent holding in Superbox, and
its White Cap plant in Poole, England, which manufactured metal clo-
sures for bottles. Continental would cause Europemballage to offer to
purchase the outstanding stock in TDV not already held by Metal Box.
The leading French container manufacturer, J.J. Carnaud, declined the
offer to join the agreement.' 5
The offer for outstanding TDV stock was made on March 16,
12. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 318.
13. Id.
14. Hermann, Monopolies Case Fails to Clarify EEC Position, The Financial
Times (London), March 15, 1973, at 36, col. 2.
15. id.
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1970. Within one month the commission had warned all the com-
panies involved that such a purchase might be considered an infringe-
ment of Article 86. In response, Metal Box decided to suspend its
entrance into Continental's "master plan for Europe." '16 The purchase
of TDV shares by Europemballage, still 100 percent owned by Contin-
ental, increased Continental's share of TDV stock to 91.07 percent. It
was this transaction that the commission found to be abusive and an
impermissible extension of the dominant position Continental already
held through its control of SLW. In its decision, the commission
stated:
23. Where an enterprise that has a dominant position strength-
ens that position through a concentration with another enterprise,
with the result that the competition, which actually or potentially
might have subsisted in spite of the existence of the dominant
position, is virtually eliminated for the products concerned in a
substantial part of the Common Market, this constitutes conduct
that is incompatible with Article 86 of the Treaty.
24. Continental's acquistion of its competitor TDV, which itself
has a strong position in a market adjoining the German market,
constitutes an industrial operation that causes an irreversible
change in the supply structure in a substantial part of the Common
Market. 17
Review of the Commission's Decision
The commission used a four step analysis to find that Continental
had violated Article 86. First it asserted, without giving reasons, that
Article 86 was applicable to some mergers. 18 Presumably the commis-
sion felt its reasons had been adequately detailed in the 1965 Concen-
tration Memorandum. 9 Second, the commission asserted that Contin-
ental enjoyed a dominant position in Germany, a substantial part of
the Common Market. 0 This conclusion was based on the reasoning
that because Continental controlled SLW, and because SLW was found
to hold a dominant position in the German markets for certain kinds
16. Gofton, The Tin Can Test Case of EEC Monopoly Control, The Financial
Times (London), Nov. 24, 1972, at 13, col. 1.
17. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 325. The commission has also made
similar rulings regarding extension of dominant positions in Re GEMA, 10 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D35 (1971) and in Laboratorio Chimico Farmacentico Giorgio Zoja Sp A
v. Commercial Solvents Corp. & Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, 12 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. D50 (1973), appeal docketed, 16 E.E.C. J.O. C36/5. Neither of these cases in-
volved a merger and at present neither has been reviewed by the European Court.
18. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 323.
19. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
20. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 326.
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of metal containers and metal closures, 2 ' SLW's dominant position
could be ascribed to Continental.2 2  Third, although existing competi-
tion was negligible between SLW and TDV in the areas of Northern and
Central Germany and in the Benelux countries, the commission found
a potential for increased competition.23 It was this potential competition
that the acquisition of TDV allegedly restricted. Fourth, the commission
found that trade between Member States was likely to be affected be-
cause the potential trade would be across national boundaries.2
The facts of this case were not ideal for the commission's purpose
of establishing a basis for future merger control. The Court agreed
with the Advocate-General, Dr. Roemer, that the commission had not
fully analyzed sources of potential competition for SLW in Germany. 5
Its main failure here was that it did not adequately distinguish the
markets it chose as relevant from one another or from the nonrelevant
container markets.
It can be assumed that these products have a separate market
only if they are distinguishable from others not just by the mere
fact that they are used for packing certain products, but also be-
cause of special production features that make them specifically
suited for that purpose. On this basis, a dominant position on the
market for light metal containers for canned meats and fish is not
shown so long as it has not been proved that competitors in other
areas of the market for light metal containers cannot, by making
a simple adjustment, step into that market with sufficient strength
to provide a serious counterbalance.
26
The commission also did not analyze satisfactorily the potential for
competition from foreign manufacturers, from manufacturers of glass
21. Specifically, the commission found that SLW was dominant in Germany in
the markets for light metal containers for meat and meat products, fish and fish prod-
ucts, and for metal closures other than crown corks for glass jars. Id.
22. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 326. Cunningham refers to the the-
ory that the market position and actions of a controlled enterprise can be ascribed to the
controlling enterprise as the "enterprise entity" theory. J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETI-
TION LAW OF THE EEC 111, (1973) [hereinafter cited as CUNNINGHAM].
The commission has also made decisions on this issue in Laboratorio Chimico Farm-
acentico Giorgio Zoja Sp A v. Commercial Solvents Corp. & Instituto Chemioterapico
Italiano, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D50 (1973), appeal docketed, 16 E.E.C. J.O. C3615,
and Dyestuffs decision, 12 E.E.C. J.0. L195 (1969), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 9314, at 8687. This aspect of the Dyestuffs decision was
criticized in Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (1973).
23. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 326.
24. Id. at 326-27.
25. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8310-11 (conclusions of Advocate General
Karl Roemer).
26. Id. at 8301.
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and plastic containers and from canners who were large enough to man-
ufacturer their own containers if SLW's prices did not remain reason-
able. 7  Consequently, the Court held that the commission had not met
its burden of proof in the case to establish as the first step in its case
that SLW was dominant.2 8
Considering the very distinct natures of the German and Dutch
container markets, the Court also found that the commission had not
proved that there was any potential competition between SLW and
TDV to be restricted. 29 This was an especially difficult task because
Continental, as licensor of all the major metal container manufacturers
in Europe, arguably had been restricting past competition with its li-
censes.8" The commission was in a dilemma because by the time it
could review these licensing agreements under Article 85, a merger,
fait accompli, would have made the licenses unnecessary. The formerly
separate enterprises could collaborate with impunity as divisions of a
large multinational corporation. Similarly, proceeding against the mer-
ger would be difficult without being able to indicate some past history
that suggested a potential for competition.3 1
Stating the commission's position strongly, it may be said that at
the time of the warnings to the parties involved, Continental was trying
to amalgamate under its control the largest metal container producers
in Italy, Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries. As a matter
of policy, this meant that if the commission did not act immediately,
the Common Market would lose a large measure of control over these
resources to an American firm. By the time the commission had
27. Id. at 8309 (conclusion of Advocate General Karl Roemer).
28. Id. at 8302. According to Mine. Espion of the EEC Commission, the com-
mission did not publish a full analysis of the market structure because it mistakenly
placed too much reliance on what it felt to be the conclusive nature of the market
share statistics in this case. Interview with Mine. Espion of the EEC Commission,
in Brussels, Belgium, April 2, 1973.
29. Id.
30. The commission was concerned with possible territorial or quota restrictions
in the Continental licenses. For discussion of the commission's dilemma, see V. Korah,
The Control of Mergers under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty: Continental Can, 26
CuRmN LEa. PRoB. 82 (1973).
31. It is interesting to note that German and Benelux licensees of American Can
Co., which is larger than Continental in the United States and rivals it in total world
sales, had been absorbed respectively into SLW and TDV. CCH Comm. MKT. REp.
No. 178, at 323. American Can Co. was therefore virtually absent from the relevant
market because the American licenses expired upon acquisition of the licensees. Per-
haps some understanding for market sharing could be inferred between Continental and
American Can. Such an understanding, if one could be shown, would violate United
States, European Economic Community and many Member State antitrust provisions.
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instituted proceedings, Carnaud of France had definitely decided not
to join and Metal Box had suspended entry pending the outcome of
any proceedings.32 Consequently, the only completed merger of which
the commission could complain was the acquisition of TDV.
The commission certainly did not have an easy case on the facts
nor, as will be seen, on the law. The absence of any oppressive or
unfair activity on the part of the enterprises involved meant that it
would be more difficult than otherwise for the commission to prove
"abuse" contrary to Article 86. It also meant, however, that the Court
would be confronted much more directly than otherwise with a situation
requiring a decision regarding use of Article 86 as an instrument of
merger control. Because this was the best available situation, the com-
mission, in a high level policy decision, chose to use this as the vehicle
for raising its contention that Article 86 may be applicable to mer-
gers.
33
As stated above,34 the commission's failure to prove the domi-
nance of SLW and thus, by implication, of Continental, resulted in a
decision allowing Continental's acquisition of TDV. Because of that
and the commission's decision not to reopen proceedings,33 Metal Box
could resume its participation in the initial plan. Presumably, however,
the commission could proceed against this extended amalgamation as
a merger quite independent of the TDV acquisition.
36
Legal Arguments Regarding the Use of Article 86
as an Instrument of Merger Control
Arguments Based On a Literal Interpretation of Article 86
Article 86:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as
32. Commission Decision, supra note 10, at 317.
33. Hermann, The Victory of Continental Can, The Financial Times (London),
Feb. 22, 1973, at 7, col. 4. Continental Can vs. The Commission, Financial Times
European Law Newsletter, Oct. 1972, at I (A. H. Hermann ed.).
34. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
35. Cross, EEC Prepares the Way for Control of Mergers, The Times (London),
Feb. 28, 1973. "'The Continental Can case was a test case, not for the case itself,
but for the doctrine', says Mr. Borschette [the commissioner in charge of competition
policy]: 'and on the doctrine we won.' For this reason he rules out any reopening
of the case 'under present circumstances.'" Id.
36. Mine. Espion suggests that such a proceeding would be brought and that in-
vestigation of possible remaining licensing violations will continue. Interview with
Mine. Espion of the EEC Commission, in Brussels, Belgium, April 2, 1973.
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it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in
particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development
to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contracts.
37
A literal interpretation of Article 86 suggests that both a dominant
position and abuse are necessary for application of the statute. Because
the requisite market power must exist before there can be any abuse
contrary to Article 86, the methods by which that market power was
created originally are not relevant to the application of Article 86.
Therefore, it does not matter whether the dominant position is created
by merger or by internal growth.
Article 86 does not distinguish among varying degrees of market
power; by its language, a 100 percent market share is no more suspect
than a lesser dominant position. Consequently, as long as abusive
methods are not employed, extending a dominant position even to the
point of 100 percent market control is just as permissible as the crea-
tion or continuation of a dominant position. Thus, the strengthening
of a dominant position by merger, assuming that the merger contains
no otherwise objectionable features, is permissible and outside the pro-
scription of Article 86. Of course, if the merger did contain objec-
tionable features, they would be objectionable regardless of whether or
not a dominant position was involved.38 Some of the basic assumptions
in this line of reasoning are open to challenge. It is undisputed that
as long as there is no abuse, extending a dominant position is unobjec-
tionable; but there is no reason why a feature common to all horizontal
mergers, the elimination of a separate competitor, may not be consid-
ered abusive in some situations. In such a case, the extension of a
dominant position would itself be the abuse.
In 1965, the commission took the first definitive step toward reso-
37. 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. f 2101, at 1681. See note supra.
38. Joliet, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DoMINANT POSITION 284 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as JOLIET]. Professor Joliet puts forward this argument with clarity
and accepts it as valid.
February 1974]
lution of this matter by supporting the view of the group of professors
it had assigned to study the issue.
A merger of an enterprise occupying a dominant position and an-
other enterprise, which has the effects of eliminating competition
that would otherwise continue to exist on the market and of cre-
ating a monopolistic situation, can have exactly the same harmful
effects as the practices described in Article 86(b). In fact, a
monopolistic situation removes incentives toward technical progress.
It often leads to a limitation of production, with the aim of reap-
ing maximum profits, through prices that are higher than they would
be on a market with oligopolistic competition and with a level of
production that would be higher on account of such competition.
[A] concentration of enterprises which has the effect of mo-
nopolizing a market should be treated as an improper exploita-
tion of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86, ex-
cept where special circumstances are present.
39
This position reflects a second set of arguments on the interpretation
of Article 86. The Advocate-General argued in Continental Can that
an abuse which is not covered by the four situations listed in Article
86 should at least be that same kind of abuse.4 0 Specifically, he argued
that unfair trading restrictions, limitations of production to the preju-
dice of consumers, economic discrimination, and the practice of tying
products harm consumers or competitors directly by market behavior
which is inherently predatory. By contrast, a merger is not market be-
havior but a morally neutral activity reflecting a management decision
about corporate structure which may or may not have incidental effects
on the market.4 Canellos and Silber have argued to the contrary that
the harm from limitations of production and the harm from mergers
are similar because with both, the prejudice to consumers may be in-
direct, a result of a decision concerning the internal management of
the enterprise.42 The commission's contention43 strengthens this com-
parison by pointing out that the effects of a merger involving a domi-
nant enterprise are often those very effects prohibited by Article 86
(b). The Court did not comment on this comparison but rather
39. Concentration Memorandum, supra note 9, at 30.
40. In addition to the four statutory abuses, two additional abuses were discussed
in the Concentration Memorandum. These are "cut-throat" pricing to eliminate com-
petition and "cut-throat" competition to force an unfavorable or unwanted merger on
a competitor. Id. at 29. Cunningham says that both of these are similar to economic
discrimination which is prohibited by Article 86(c) because all three distort normal
competition. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 22, at 106.
41. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8306 (conclusion of Advocate General Karl
Roemer).
42. Canellos & Silber, Concentration in the Common Market, 7 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 5, 163 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Canellos & Silber].
43. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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found mergers to be similar to economic discrimination (Article 86
(c)) and tying (Article 86(d)) because all three may have effects on
industrial structure as well as on market activity.
44
Proponents of the Advocate-General's position bolster their con-
tention with two further arguments based on the wording of the treaty.
Although the text of Article 86 is the official English text, some ana-
lysts working from the official French text feel that "exploit in an im-
proper manner" or "exploit abusively" is a better translation of the
French phrase in Article 86, "d'exploiter de fagon abusive, 45 than is
"abuse." These analysts46 reason that neither "exploitation" nor "im-
proper manner" taken alone is sufficient for the application of Article
86 but rather that the exploitation of a dominant position must be in
some way improper. The inference from this translation is that some
morally questionable behavior is required and that mergers, unless they
are shown to have this quality, are not within the proscription of the
statute.
The second related contention is that the dominant position must
be the instrument of the improper behavior. The ambiguous English
translation of the pertinent part of Article 86 reads: "Any abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position. . . shall be prohib-
ited. . . .147 The Advocate-General maintains that the statute should
be interpreted to mean that the dominant position must be the instru-
ment of the improper behavior. 4  However, the Court accepts the alter-
native interpretation, that is, that the undertakings which possess a
dominant position may not commit abuses.
It is difficult to know what sort of instrumental use of dominant
position the Advocate/General would require. For example, Conti-
nental's size rather than its dominance enabled it to make the purchase.
Presumably quite a number of other enterprises could also have pur-
chased TDV. On the other hand, Continental did use its dominant
position as the foundation for the creation of a larger dominant position
44. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8300.
45. The official French text reads in pertinent part: "Est incompatible avec le
march6 commun et'interdit, dans la mesure oa le commerce entre ttats membres est
susceptible den 6tre affect6, le fait pour une on plusieurs enterprises d'exploiter de
fagon abusive une position dominante sur le march6 commun on dans une partie
substantielle de celuici." 1 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 2101, at 1681. See note 2 supra.
46. These analysts have used translations other than "abuse." E.g., JOLIET, supra
note 38.
47. 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 2101, at 1681. See note 2 supra.
48. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8306 (conclusions of Advocate General Karl
Roemer).
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to the extent that its new dominance, which grew from the acquisition of
TDV, would not have been possible without its initial dominant position.
It should be noted that if Article 86 does require that the dominant po-
sition be used as the instrument of some morally wrong behavior, then it
would be incorrect to assert that mere extension of a dominant position
may itself constitute abuse.
Arguments Based on the Interpretation of Treaty Objectives
In attempting to resolve these problems, the Court looked for guid-
ance to Article 3(f) which states:
For the purposes set out in Article 2,49 the activities of the
Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in ac-
cordance with the timetable set out therein ... the institution
of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is
not distorted ..... 50
The Court interpreted this statute to place the emphasis on the
effect produced regardless of how the alleged abuse was achieved.5'
The phrase "is not distorted," refers to all activity which may produce
the effect of distorted competition in the Common Market. There are
no requirements that the activity employ the dominant position to
achieve the effect, be predatory or occur directly in the market if the
effect of the activity is contrary to Article 86 as interpreted in the light
of Article 3(f). Similarly, the Court minimized the distinctions be-
tween "abuse" and "abusive exploitation" and between "alteration of
industrial structure" and "impairment of market performance" by rea-
soning that "any structural measure can influence market conditions
whenever it increases the size and economic power of the enterprise."52
The Court's reliance on Articles 2 and 3(f) highlights another
area of disagreement. Continental Can Company and the Advocate-
General both argued against such reliance, asserting that Articles 2 and
3(f) are only general declarations of policy, too broadly stated for use-
ful application and not directly applicable in member states without
enabling legislation.53 Nevertheless, the Court held that the spirit and
49. Article 2 of the Rome Treaty states: "The Community shall have as its task,
by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic poli-
cies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious develop-
ment of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in sta-
bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it." 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 165, at 210. See note 2 supra.
50. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 171, at 211. See note 10 supra.
51. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8300.
52. Id. at 8299.
53. Id. at 8306-07 (conclusions of Advocate General Karl Roemer).
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terms of Article 86 should be examined in the light of the treaty's
objectives as described in Articles 2 and 3(f) and implemented in
Articles 85 to 90.11 A primary objective that undistorted compe-
tition be maintained would be violated and a loophole created in
Community competition policy if, where a cartel restricting com-
petition would be prohibited, a merger of enterprises involving a domi-
nant position was allowed to cause the same restrictions yet evade legal
sanction.5 5 Because Articles 85 and 86 both serve the purposes de-
clared in Article 3(f), the Court reasoned, they cannot be interpreted
as inconsistent with each other.
The implied reasoning is that because the system instituted to
prevent distorted competition is in Articles 85 to 90, anything which
distorts competition violates Articles 85 to 90.56 However, it should
be clear at this point that the wording of Articles 2 and 3 (f) neither
requires nor forbids the interpretation that the Court chose. For ex-
ample, the Court could have reasoned that if Articles 85 to 90 were
designed to implement the objectives of Articles 2 and 3(f), and if
Articles 85 to 90 do not expressly provide for control of mergers, then
control of mergers is outside the scope of Articles 2 and 3(f). The
choice here is clearly one of policy. 57
Arguments Based on Legislative Intent
Two sets of arguments against application of Article 86 to mer-
gers were not given much weight by the Court. The first and one of
the most convincing arguments5" is that the framers of the Rome Treaty
in most respects closely followed the model of the competition provi-
sions of the Paris Treaty found in Articles 65 and 66"9 yet did not
54. Id. at 8299-8300.
55. Id. at 8300. See Mestmricher, Concentration and Competition in the EEC:
Part 1I, 7 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 36, 39 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mestmiicher].
56. It is at this point in the analysis that many fears arise that Articles 85 and
86 will be expanded to cover every activity which arguably can be claimed to distort
competition, regardless of whether or not the activity was traditionally considered to
be outside the language and scope of Articles 85 and 86. See text beginning at note
88 infra.
57. Both of these interpretations are tautological. Resolution of the central dis-
pute and the validity of either of these interpretations rests on the definitions of "com-
petition" and "distorted." At present both of these concepts are vague.
58. JOLIET, supra note 38, at 225.
59. The competition provisions of the Paris Treaty are embodied in Articles 65
& 66.
Article 65 provides that:
1. There are hereby forbidden all agreements among enterprises, all decisions of as-
sociations of enterprises, and all concerted practices, which would tend, directly or in-
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include the merger control provisions found within that treaty. Articles
65 and 66(7) of the Paris Treaty establishing the European Coal and
directly to prevent, restrict or impede the normal operation of competition within the
common market, and in particular:
(a) to fix or influence prices; (b) to restrict or control production, technical
development or investments; (c) to allocate markets, products, customers or sources
of supply.
2. However, the High Authority will authorize enterprises to agree among themselves
to specialize in the production of, or to engage in joint buying or selling of specified
products, if the High Authority finds:
(a) that such specialization or such joint buying or selling will contribute to a
substantial improvement in the production or marketing of the products in question;
and (b) that the agreement in question is essential to achieve such effects, and does
not impose any restriction not necessary for that purpose; and (c) that it is not sus-
ceptible of giving the interested enterprises the power to influence prices, or to control
or limit production or marketing of an appreciable part of the products in question
within the common market, or of protecting them from effective competition by other
enterprises within the common market.
If the High Authority should recognize that certain agreements are strictly analo-
gous in their nature and effects to the agreements mentioned above, taking into account
the application of the present section to distributing enterprises, it will authorize such
agreements if it further recognizes that they satisfy the same conditions.
An authorization may be made subject to specified conditions and may be limited
in time. If so limited, the High Authority will renew it once or several times if it
finds that at the time of renewal the conditions stated in paragraph (a) to (c) above
are still fulfilled.
The High Authority will revoke or modify the authorization if it finds that as
a result of changes in circumstances the agreement no longer fulfills the conditions
set forth above, or that the actual effects of the agreement or of the operations under
it are contrary to the conditions required for its approval.
The decisions granting, modifying, refusing or revoking an authorization shall be
published along with their justification; the limitations contained in the second para-
graph of Article 47 shall not be applicable to such publication.
3. The High Authority may obtain, in accordance with the provisions of Article 47,
any information necessary to the application of the present article, either by a special
request addressed to the interested parties or by a regulation defining the nature of
the agreements, decisions or practices which must be communicated to it.
4. Any agreement or decision which is prohibited by virtue of Section 1 of the present
article shall be automatically void and may not be invoked before any court or tribunal
of the member States.
The High Authority has exclusive competence, subject to appeals to the Court,
to rule on the conformity of such agreements or decisions with the provisions of the
present article.
5. The High Authority may pronounce against enterprises: which have concluded an
agreement which is automatically void; which have complied with, enforced or at-
tempted to enforce by arbitration, forfeiture, boycott or any other means, an agreement
or decision which is automatically void or an agreement for which approval has been
refused or revoked; which shall have obtained an authorization by means of knowingly
false or misleading information; or which engage in practices contrary to the provi-
sions of Section 1, fines and daily penalty payments not to exceed double the turnover
actually realized on the products which have been the subject of the agreement, decision
or practice contrary to the provisions of the present article; if the object of the agree-
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Steel Community (hereinafter referred to as ECSC) closely parallel
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty. However. Articles 66(1-6),
ment is to restrict production, technical development or investments, this maximum
may be raised to 10 percent of the annual turnover of the enterprises in question, in
the case of fines, and 20 percent of the daily turnover in the case of daily penalty
payments.
Article 66 provides that:
1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, any transaction which would have in
itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing about a concentration, within the territo-
ries mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 79, involving enterprises at least one
of which falls under the application of Article 80, shall be submitted to a prior author-
ization of the High Authority. This obligation shall be effective whether the operation
in question is carried out by a person or an enterprise, or a group of persons or en-
terprises, whether it concerns a single product or different products, whether it is ef-
fected by merger, acquisition of shares or assets, loan, contract, or any other means
of control. For the application of the above provisions, the High Authority will define
by a regulation, established after consultation with the Council, what constitutes control
of an enterprise.
2. The High Authority will grant the authorization referred to in the preceding para-
graph if it finds that the transaction in question will not give to the interested persons
or enterprises, as concerns those of the products in question which are subject to its
jurisdiction, the power:
-to influence prices, to control or restrain production or marketing, or to impair
the maintenance of effective competition in a substantial part of the market for such
products; or
-to evade the rules of competition resulting from the application of the present
Treaty, particularly by establishing an artificially privileged position involving a mate-
rial advantage in access to supplies or markets.
In this appreciation, and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination
set forth in sub-paragraph (b) of Article 4, the High Authority will take account of
the size of enterprises of the same nature existing in the Community, to the extent
it deems justified to avoid or correct the disadvantages resulting from an inequality
in the conditions of competition.
The High Authority may subject such an authorization to any conditions which
it deems appropriate for the purposes of the present section.
Before taking action on a transaction concerning enterprises of which at least one
is not subject to the application of Article 80, the High Authority will request the
observations of the interested government.
3. The High Authority will exempt from the requirement of prior authorization those
classes of transactions which, by the size of the assets or enterprises which they affect
taken together with the nature of the concentration they bring about, must in its opin-
ion be held to conform to the conditions required by Section 2. The regulation estab-
lished for this purpose with the concurrence of the Council will also fix the conditions
to which such exemption is to be subject.
4. Without limiting the applicability of the provisions of Article 47 to enterprises sub-
ject to its jurisdiction, the High Authority may obtain from physical or juridical persons
who have acquired or regrouped or might acquire or regroup the rights or assets in
question, any information necessary to the application of the present article concerning
operations which might produce the effect mentioned in Section 1; it may do this either
by a regulation established after consultation with the Council which defines the nature
of the operations which must be communicated to it, or by a special demand addressed
to the interested parties within the framework of such regulation.
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in which the merger control provisions for the Paris Treaty are created,
have no counterpart in the Rome Treaty. Professor Joliet argues that
5. If a concentration should occur, which the High Authority finds has been effected
contrary to the provisions of Section 1 but which it finds nevertheless satisfies the
conditions provided in Section 2, it will subject the approval of this concentration to
the payment, by the persons who have acquired or regrouped the rights or assets in
question, of the fine provided in the second subparagraph of Section 6; such payment
shall not be less than half of the maximum provided in the said sub-paragraph in any
case where it is clear that the authorization should have been requested. In the ab-
sence of this payment, the High Authority will apply the measures provided hereafter
for concentrations found to be illegal.
If a concentration should occur which the High Authority recognizes cannot sat-
isfy the general or special conditions to which an authorization under Section 2 would
be subject, it will establish the illegal character of this concentration by a decision
accompanied by a justification; after having allowed the interested parties to present
their observations, the High Authority shall order the separation of the enterprises or
assets wrongly concentrated or the cessation of common control, as well as any other
action which it deems appropriate to re-establish the independent operation of the en-
terprises or assets in question and to restore normal conditions of competition. Any
person directly interested may take an appeal against such decisions under the condi-
tions provided in Article 33. Notwithstanding the provisions of that article, the Court
shall be fully competent to judge whether the operation effected is a concentration
within the meaning of Section 1 of the present article and of the regulations issued
in application of that section. This appeal shall be suspensive. It may not be taken
until the measures provided above have been ordered, unless the High Authority
should agree to the taking of a separate appeal against the decision declaring the trans-
action illegal.
The High Authority may at any time, subject to the possible application of the
provisions of the third paragraph of Article 39, take or cause to be taken such measures
as it may deem necessary to safeguard the interests of competing enterprises and of
third parties, and to prevent any action which might impede the execution of its deci-
sions. Unless the Court decides otherwise, appeals shall not suspend the application
of such precautionary measures.
The High Authority will grant to the interested parties a reasonable period in
which to execute its decisions, at the expiration of which it may begin to impose daily
penalty payments not to exceed one tenth of one percent of the value of the rights
or assets in question.
Furthermore, if the interested parties fail to fulfill their obligations, the High Au-
thority shall itself take measures of execution and in particular may: suspend the exer-
cise, in enterprises subject to its jurisdiction, of the rights attached to the assets illegally
acquired; bring about the designation by judicial authorites of a receiver-administrator
for these assets; organize the forced sale of such assets in conditions preserving the
legitimate interests of their proprietors; annul, with respect to physical or juridical per-
sons who have acquired the rights or assets in question by the effect of illegal trans-
action, the acts, decisions, resolutions, or deliberations of the directing organs of enter-
prises subject to a control which has been irregularly established.
The High Authority is also empowered to address to the interested member States
the recommendations necessary to obtain, within the framework of national legislation,
the execution of the measures provided for in the preceding paragraphs.
In the exercise of its powers, the High Authority shall take account of the rights
of third persons which have been acquired in good faith.
6. The High Authority may impose fines not to exceed:
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because of the striking similarities in language between the provisions
of the two treaties, the probabilities are against the possible alternative
conclusion that the merger control provisions of Articles 66(1-6) are
present but unspecified within Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.60
There are, however, several counterarguments. First, this reason-
ing is in essence an attempt to discern the legislative intent of the draft-
ers of the Rome Treaty. To avoid reasoning based on legislative intent,
the travaux preparatoires were to be locked away and interpretation
was supposed to rest solely on the wording of the Treaty itself. It may
be for this reason that the Court, in its judgment in Continental Can,
did not find a comparison of the treaties relevant.61
Second, the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Rome
Treaty were far different from those surrounding that of the Paris
Treaty. Consequently, similar language in the two treaties may require
different interpretations. After the war, some reorganization, rationali-
zation and integration in Europe's coal and steel industries were felt
to be needed for economic recovery and to prevent Germany from re-
establishing her uncontrolled strength in these areas. These are corn-
-3 percent of the value of the assets acquired or regrouped or to be acquired
or regrouped, against physical or juridical persons who shall have violated the obliga-
tions provided for in Section 4;
-10 percent of the value of the assets acquired or regrouped, against physical
or juridical persons which shall have violated the obligation provided for in Section
1; after the end of the twelfth month following the transaction, this maximum shall
be raised by one-twenty-fourth per month which elapses until the High Authority es-
tablishes the existence of the violation;
-10 percent of the value of the assets acquired or regrouped or to be acquired
or regrouped, against physical or juridical persons which shall have obtained or at-
tempted to obtain the benefit of the provisions of Section 2 by means of false or mis-
leading information;
-15 percent of the value of the assets acquired or regrouped, against enterprises
subject to its jurisdiction which shall have participated in or lent themselves to the
realization of transactions contrary to the provisions of the present article.
Persons who are the object of sanctions provided for in the present paragraph may
appeal before the Court under the conditions provided for in Article 36.
7. To the extent necessary, the High Authority is empowered to address to public
or private enterprises which, in law or in fact, have or acquire on the market for one
of the products subject to its jurisdiction a dominant position which protects them from
effective competition in a substantial part of the common market, any recommenda-
tions required to prevent the use of such position for purposes contrary to those of
the present Treaty. If such recommendations are not fulfilled satisfactorily within a
reasonable period, the High Authority will, by decisions taken in consultation with the
interested government and under the sanctions provided for in Articles 58, 59 and 64,
fix the prices and conditions of sale to be applied by the enterprise in question, or
establish manufacturing or delivery programs to be executed by it.
60. JOLIET, supra note 38, at 274-76.
61. Court Decisions, supra note 10, at 8299.
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paratively limited purposes for which the more specific drafting of the
Paris Treaty is appropriate, particularly in dealing with industries in
which concentrations have been historically prevalent. Because the
Rome Treaty covers a full spectrum of economic activity, too much
specificity in drafting would have been self-defeating. At the time of
the formation of the EEC, Europe was less fractured politically than
it was in the postwar climate of the Paris Treaty negotiations. Whereas
the competition provisions of the Paris Treaty were actually written in
Washington, D.C.,62 it is arguable that by the middle 1950's, Europeans
had enough experience with conjoint administration of antitrust laws
to fashion a competition policy to match the broadly stated aims
and coverage of the Rome Treaty. Moreover, although the language
of the competition statutes of the Rome and Paris Treaties are similar,
the provisions are not identical. This is evidenced by the requirement
of Article 66(7) of the Paris Treaty that the High Authority conduct
discussions with Member States, 63 a requirement which is not found
in Article 86 of the Rome Treaty. 64 This difference is one reason for
the suggestion that Article 86 was meant to be more comprehensive
than Article 66(7).
The third of the counterarguments arises from the Oberrkeinische
Kohlenunion65 case cited by Deringer66 and discussed by Canellos and
Silber 67 to the effect that Articles 65 and 66 of the Paris Treaty are
not mutually exclusive in coverage. If this is expanded to argue that
Articles 66(1-6) and 66(7) are also not mutually exclusive, then Arti-
cle 66(7), which has never been applied in a merger context, theoreti-
cally would be applicable to mergers. Consequently, even if Joliet's
assertion is correct that Article 86 is based on Article 66(7),68 Article
86 would not exclude merger situations. Again, it is submitted that
legalistic arguments do not resolve the dispute.
The other set of arguments not discussed by the Court is that
interpretation of national laws, especially those of Germany and Hol-
land, 9 in which the concepts of dominant position and its abuse are
62. EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 246.
63. See note 59 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
65. Decision of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
July 11, 1953.
66. A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COM-
MUNITY (1968).
67. Canellos & Silber, supra note 42, at 158.
68. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
69. See EDwARDs, supra note 8, at 177-97. The Belgian Law also includes these
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incorporated reveals that the framers of the Rome Treaty, working from
their collective national experiences, intended the scope of Article 86
to be much narrower than the Court now holds it to be. Related to
this are arguments based on speeches made to national assemblies, par-
ticularly at the time of the Rome Treaty negotiations, explaining that
the scope of Article 86 would not include merger control.70 Consider-
ing the political bargaining on both the national and international levels
that surrounded the drafting of the Rome Treaty, it would be an error
to put too much reliance on any particular speeches or on personal in-
terpretations of national laws. Therefore, it will be submitted here that
these arguments have no greater relevance than other arguments based
on legislative history.
In Dubio, Pro Liberte
The last of the traditional arguments against application of Article
86 to mergers is more jurisprudential than legalistic. Because of this,
it serves to emphasize this author's contention that because the Court
did not have legally dispositive arguments on which to rely its decision
had to be one based mainly on considerations of policy. The Advocate-
General rightly noted that the commission was seeking a wide interpre-
tation of Article 86 but in disagreement urged "in dubio pro liberte,"
"in doubt, for freedom.' In other words, where a statute does not
proscribe an action specifically, the statute should be interpreted to al-
low that action. This argument should be given added force when con-
sidering the penal nature of the sanction provided in Regulation 17/62,
Article 15.72
Dr. Gleiss, making this argument for the Continental Can Corn-
concepts but it was passed after the Rome Treaty was drafted and there has been little
experience under it. Edwards notes that the concept of abuse has not acquired much
precision in most countries where it is used. Id. at 184.
70. To the contrary, Ernst Joachim Mestmlicher asserts that the Spaak Report,
the most important public material on the Treaty preparation, allows at pages 59-60
for the control of mergers by the use of powers to make regulations under Article
87. Mestmicher, supra note 55, at 38. This would imply that control of mergers
is included within Articles 85 and 86.
71. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8306. The Advocate-General stated:
"[-Ilere also the principle 'in dubio pro libertate' should be followed as prominent au-
thors have always emphasized in connection with the similar provision of § 22 of the
German Law against Restraint of Competition in order to attain close adherence to
the wording of the provision."
72. Under Article 15(2) of Council Regulation 17, the commission may impose
a fine of up to 10 percent of the previous year's turnover on a party that wilfully
or negligently infringes Articles 85(1) or 86 of the Rome Treaty. 13 E.E.C. J.0.
204 (1962).
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pany before the Court, argued that such a wide interpretation of Arti-
cle 86 as urged by the commission would put too great a burden on
the statutory structure of the community. The community, he urged,
is at its strongest when those it governs have confidence that they are
being held to comply only with what they clearly agreed and when
they know what the law is so that they can obey it.7 3  Merger control
requires community legislation and the appropriate framework for such
changes in EEC law is Article 235.74
Canellos and Silber suggest a teleological response to this argu-
ment.7'5  They reason, as did the Court in applying Article 3(f), that
because the EEC is designed to be a common market rather than
a planned economy, it is necessary that effective competition, as the
basis of that market, be protected. Consequently, Articles 85 and 86
should be interpreted toward this goal, even if it means broad statu-
tory interpretations. They cite the statement of Chief Justice Hughes
in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States:
The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act [which, like Article 86,
is broadly drafted] is to prevent undue restraints of inter-state com-
merce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest,
to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of
monopolistic endeavor. As a charter of freedom, the Act has a
generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desir-
able in constitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed defi-
nitions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or





If, as is being contended, legalisms provide no resolution of the
central dispute, then it is necessary to look to policy considerations for
determining factors. So little of the criteria regarding control of domi-
nant firms is provided in the primary and secondary legislation that
73. Pleadings by Continental Can Co., at 52-54, Europemballage & Continental
Can Co. v. EEC Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Pleadings].
74. Article 235 of the Rome Treaty provides: "Where action by the Community
appears necessary to achieve one of the objectives of the Community, within the frame-
work of the Common Market, and where this treaty has not provided for the necessary
powers of action, the Council shall adopt the appropriate provisions by a unanimous
decision, after consulting the Assembly." 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 5325, at 4367.
See note 2 supra.
75. Canellos & Silber, supra note 42, at 151.
76. 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST
the job of shaping law, and therefore policy, comes within the province
of judicial interpretation. Because the law on combinations and con-
centrations is undeveloped, the motifs reflect those choices of policy which
the Court must make in order to reach its decision. It must have been
clear to the Court, whether it liked the situation or not, that holding
Article 86 inapplicable to mergers in the absence of predatory tactics
could influence policy as much as the broader interpretation of Article
86 which it chose.
It is conceivable that the Court could have granted Continental's
appeal on the facts and not decided the legal issue; but this would have
been unwise considering the importance of the central problem and
the limited opportunities of the Court for statutory interpretation. The
Court took what was probably the next most jurisprudentially conserva-
tive action by deciding that Article 86 did apply to mergers but by
giving little concrete guidance as to how Article 86 should be applied.
Beyond direction to the commission that it publish a fuller structural
analysis of the market in its decisions, the Court said little that a
businessman could use to help him decide what course of action to
take in a specific situation, deferring instead to the other Common
Market institutions in this matter.
By such deference, the Court was able to increase the flexibility
of action of the other EEC institutions and thereby lessen the direct
impact of its decision on EEC policy. The Court knew that if Article
86 was limited to covering predatory mergers, then regulations on mer-
ger control would not be possible under Article 87. It is asserted here
that under Article 23577 it would be politically easier to restrict a
court's holding that Article 86 is applicable to mergers than to create
completely new powers in the face of an opposite holding. Of course,
such a restriction is unlikely, but at least the possibility remains open
for the council, commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Par-
liament.78
77. On the use of Articles 87 or 235 as the basis of a new regulation, see text
accompanying notes 129-42 infra.
78. The Council of Ministers is comprised of delegates of each member state
and is the primary legislative body for the Common Market. The European Commis-
sion is the primary enforcement body of the Common Market, though it does initiate
some legislation by making proposals to the council. The European Parliament is at
present primarily an advisory body, with its major powers centered in the budgetary
field.
Members of the commission are appointed by member states but, unlike the coun-
cil members, are required to act without regard to national origin. Members to the
European Parliament are appointed by, and act as a delegation of, their member states.
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Related to this is the recognition of the commission's function
as a body for making and implementing policy as well as for applying
law. The Court may well have felt inclined to defer to the opinion
of a body which has been reviewing problems related to combinations
and concentrations since 1962. Similarly, because the commission de-
clared in its Concentration Memorandum that Article 85 would not be
applied to mergers,79 the Court must have been aware that without some
drastic shift of position by the commission or a significant case on the
topic, the only merger control in the treaty without additional legislation
must come from Article 86.80 It is quite possible that the Court felt
reluctant to close off this remaining possibility.
Economic Considerations
Perhaps more influential considerations for resolving the dispute
arise from the practical concerns of economics and politics. An initial
economic concern of the Court would be to favor balance and certainty
in competition policy. On this ground, however, the Court's decision
has been criticized .8  Two hypothetical examples will serve to illustrate
the problems. First, in a hypothetical industry with 100 firms each
controlling 1 percent of the market, if one firm begins to buy out the
other firms one by one, when does the purchasing firm become domi-
nant and when does a purchase become abusive? This presents the
classic problem of "line drawing" which, with regard to the application
of Article 86, is a very real concern. Because there is no available
guidance other than broad generalities for distinguishing bad mergers
from permissible ones, a well-intentioned board of directors cannot be
sure where to strike the balance between duties owed to shareholders
to pursue lucrative opportunities for expansion and duties owed to the
European Communities not to overextend a dominant position.
For the second hypothetical example, assume that a firm with 70
percent market share in a given field is unquestionably dominant and
acquires its largest rival which has a 10 percent market share. Such
an acquisition could easily be considered an abuse under Article 86.
If there were three firms in the example, however, each with less than a
There is presently a movement within the Common Market to strengthen the powers
of the European Parliament and to elect the members in a European plebiscite.
79. It is quite possible that one major factor influencing the commission to limit
the scope of Article 85 was that the same Memorandum purported to expand the scope
of Article 86 and the former was a concession to make the Memorandum more accept-
able.
80. See text accompanying notes 108-14 infra.
81. See note 30 supra.
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30 percent market share, presumably none by itself would be dominant
and conceivably the three might not enjoy a collective dominant posi-
tion. An amalgamation of these three firms would again cause 80 per-
cent of the market to be consolidated in one firm. Although the Court
in Continental Can concentrated on the effect produced rather than
how it was produced, Article 86 conceivably would not apply to the
second situation because there was no pre-existing individually or col-
lectively held dominant position. Yet, it could be argued that the sec-
ond situation is actually more deleterious to competition than the first
because less competition will be eliminated in the first situation in
which the acquiring firm was initially seven times as large as the ac-
quired firm. The inconsistent and unbalanced application of Article
86 is not only a problem in itself but also adds to the general lack
of predictability in this field.
The hypothetical examples illustrate problems which the Court's
decision both aggravate and relieve. For proper perspective, it should
be noted that there was considerable uncertainty regarding the concepts
in Article 86 even before Continental Can. Commentators could only
speculate as to the meanings of "dominant position" and "abuse." Un-
certainty and perhaps imbalance and inconsistency are to be expected
when dealing with relatively new and untested statutes. Additionally,
throughout the entire antitrust field, uncertainty is an inherent and seri-
ous problem due to the awkward but necessary mixing of legal and
economic concepts. At least now there is no question about the general
legality of applying Article 86 to mergers; but because there are still
no available guidelines to help with specific situations, concerns will
remain. If the inconsistency in the second hypothetical example is
relieved in some situations by regarding the merging firms as collec-
tively holding a dominant position in an oligopolistic industry, 2 then
even medium-sized or smaller firms will have Article 86 concerns for
their acquisitions.
The Continental Can case helps to relieve these problems in sev-
eral ways. By supporting the commissions legal contentions, the Court
has given support and impetus to further commission proceedings under
Article 86. It is hoped that with the fuller structural analysis of the
82. This approach is consistent with the wording of Article 86 which begins,
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position . . . ." 1 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. § 2101, at 1681. Some connection between the firms would probably
be required before the firms could be considered collectively. Consequently this ap-
proach probably could not be applied to an acquisition of an enterprise by purchase of
its stock through a stock exchange.
market demanded by the Court,83 the new cases will serve to present
some guidance for businessmen until a new regulation is adopted. Sec-
ondly, by highlighting the problems regarding all forms of concentra-
tion and combination, the Court's decision adds force to the drive for
the resolution of these problems and, inevitably, for the new regulation.
Uncertainty may be reduced significantly if enterprises can determine
easily and "with certainty"8 4 the commission's opinion of a proposed
action by use of the negative clearance procedure of Regulation
17/62, Article 2 .s" This was the commission's position in Continental
Can as it was reviewed by the Court.
Two concerns need further discussion. One is that Article 86 is
inappropriate for control of mergers because it would prohibit them
only after completion; and mergers, once completed, are very difficult
to unwind. Unlike Article 85, Article 86 contains no procedure similar
83. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
84. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8289.
85. Council Regulation 17, made on February 6, 1962 and brought into force
on March 13, 1962, 13 E.E.C. J.O. 204 (1962), was the first regulation adopted pur-
suant to Article 87 of the Rome Treaty for the purpose of implementing Article 85.
For the general relationship between Articles 85 and 87, see text accompanying note
140 infra and material cited therein. James P. Cunningham writes of Regulation 17:
"The basic provision of Regulation 17 is Article 1. Subject to certain exceptions, all
agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which infringe Article 85.1 are automat-
ically prohibited. Nothing further is required-no investigation of the case, no declara-
tion by an authority. Since the 13th March, 1962 when Regulation 17 came into force
in the present six Member States, the provisions of any agreement, etc., falling within
Article 85.1 and not coming within one of the exceptions to Article 1 of the Regulation
or within the bloc exemption granted by Regulation 67/67, have been prohibited under
85.1 and null and void under 85.2. If the void provisions form the essence of the
agreement or cannot be severed from the remainder of it, the whole agreement is null
and void. The courts of the Member States have to give effect to that nullity. They
cannot enforce the void provisions or a void agreement." CUNNINGHAM, supra note
22, at 73-74.
"Negative clearance," Article 2 of Regulation 17, is a means used by parties to
agreements to determine if their agreements comply with Article 85, Cunningham ex-
plains: "Bearing in mind the serious consequences which can flow from infringement
of Article 85.1, Regulation 17 provides a most useful procedure whereby the parties
to an agreement, etc., can seek 'negative clearance' for it, i.e. a declaration that it
does not come within the scope of, and consequently does not infringe, Article 85.1.
It might be thought that the parties would always know whether their activities were
in breach of 85.1 or not, but this is not necessarily so. To constitute a breach of
85.1 there must be an appreciable effect upon competition and an appreciable effect
upon trade between Member States. Except in the clearest possible case, within the
limits set out in the commission's 'Notice Concerning Minor Agreements' . . . or in
Regulation 2822/71 . . . it would be unwise for the parties themselves to decide that
any effect was not appreciable - they would be acting as judge in their own cause.
Wherever there is any doubt whatsoever, those concerned would be well advised to
seek negative clearance." Id. at 77.
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to Article 85(3)86 for the legalization of violations after they have been
committed. The Court did not find this consideration relevant and
merely accepted that Article 85 and 86 establish different regimes to
control different situations.a7 Use of the negative clearance procedure
and of prior notification, if such a system is introduced, will alleviate
the underlying fears of having to dismantle a completed merger. It
is also properly argued that a procedure similar to Article 85(3) is
not needed in Article 86. The requirement of Article 85(3) (b) that
competition not be eliminated would be incompatible in most circum-
stances with the provisions of Article 86 requiring dominant position
and abuse.
The second cause for concern is that the position adopted by the
Court increases uncertainty by reading into the concept of abuse the
purportedly broader concept in Article 85 of "the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition." This analysis appears misdirected.
The Court held that concentrations involving a dominant position can-
not be so closely knit as to avoid Article 85 without coming within
the sphere of Article 86.8 The only type of concentration to which
this can apply is a merger because apparently all other types of concen-
tration can be covered by Article 85. Therefore, Article 86 will not
catch much that otherwise would not have been prohibited. What is
important here and where the misdirection arises is that the Court did
not read parts of Article 85 into Article 86 but rather read into both
statutes the inclusive concept in Article 3(f) of distortion of competi-
tion."' Although problems remain in applying legal analysis to essen-
tially economic ideas, the use of Article 3(f) makes it clear that a broad
regulation, perhaps covering situations or administrative procedures not
86. Article 85(3) reads:
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promot-
ing technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the result-
ing benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispen-
sable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.
1 CCH COMM. MKr. R P. 2051, at 1661. See note 2 supra.
87. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8300.
88. Id.
89. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
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clearly within the reach of Common Market competition policy as pre-
viously interpreted, would not be incompatible with the treaty and thus
would not be outside the legislative powers of Article 235.
There are also economic policy considerations as to how broad
competition policy should be. This may appear to be a matter of more
direct concern to the council, commission and European Parliament
than to the Court. These considerations will be reviewed here not only
because they may have influenced the Court to take the flexible stand
it did, but more importantly because they certainly will influence the
nature of the new regulation which the Court's decision has helped to
foster.
Between 1962 and 1965, the commission reviewed these consider-
ations of economic policy but, in its Concentration Memorandum of
1965, it did not present any empirical data to support its assertions
regarding the benefits of and the need for large concentrations.
This adjustment of enterprises to the dimensions of the Common
Market is, furthermore, in keeping with the objectives of the Treaty
of Rome. The growth of enterprises makes it possible to increase
profitability, to accelerate technical progress, and to reduce pro-
duction costs. Effective competition will allow the consumers a fair
share of the profits resulting from the economic progress and will
raise their standard of living.
Another factor requiring a growth of European firms is the stead-
ily increasing international competition on the world markets. Be-
sides that, competition is also felt more keenly each day because
of the establishment in the E.E.C. of large foreign enterprises that
are attracted by the rapidly expanding market.
The difference between the size of foreign enterprises (par-
ticularly American and Japanese) and the size of European enter-
prises is likely to create problems with respect to the profitability
of the enterprises. 91
Since the time these statements were made, the trends regarding
amalgamation of enterprises and investment in Europe have become
more pronounced and their effects further subjected to study. The
most recent study, prepared but not yet published by the British Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, reviewed French, Italian and German in-
dustries and concluded that mergers in medium-sized companies tend
to depress EEC trade and competition and that "an industry's ability
to compete with its counterparts on [sic] the European Community
was related not so much to superior size of enterprise, as many would
90. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
91. Concentration Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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be inclined to think, but to superior plant size."'' 9 The import of this
is that it gives some empirical support to the contention that broad mer-
ger control provisions would not be detrimental to effective Common
Market and international competition. Fewer mergers will need en-
couragement and more may be challenged if this contention is accepted
by the commission.
Various studies lend support to this hypothesis by suggesting that
it is not the European firms which are undersized but the American
firms which are oversized. These studies concluded that the benefits
of large enterprises, such as those claimed in the Concentration Memo-
randum, are at best overrated. In a study of a large number of indus-
tries, maximum efficiency was found to be obtainable usually by firms
controlling much less than 10 percent of the market. Immense size
in research and development programs was found to be neither indispen-
sable for nor even found to be a guarantee of significant invention. Im-
portant factors other than size which determine significant invention are
the nature of the industry and its consumers, the product mix of the par-
ticular firm, the inventiveness of the researcher and the attitudes of man-
agement and competitors towards research and implementation of dis-
coveries. Research by dominant firms is often directed towards making
technologically insignificant changes which might enhance the market-
ing of the product. Major alterations in an established product are
often expensive to make and leading firms are often complacent or un-
willing to risk significant innovation.
One of the studies, using United Kingdom statistics for 1966-67
and employing several methods of evaluation, found that the 100 largest
enterprises on "The Times 300" are slightly less profitable than the 100
smallest firms on that list. In this study, the smaller group was found
to employ approximately one-sixth of the capital and personnel of the
larger group.9" It must be remembered that some of these studies are
now as much as ten years old or are based on statistics from the United
States where the situation, especially regarding capital-labor relations,
the amount of purchasing power in the economy and the effects of com-
petition policy, is quite different than it is in the United Kingdom or
the EEC. The issues about the size and benefits of companies and
92. Corina, Takeovers impede EEC trade, study says, The Times (London),
March 12, 1973. See also Competition in Europe, The Times (London), March 12,
1973.
93. The best review of these studies and their relevance to Article 86 is in Canel-
los & Silber, supra note 42, at 5-28 and in de Jong, Concentration in the Common
Market, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.P. 166 (1966-67).
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mergers should become much clearer in the next few years as major
studies in progress reach conclusions.94
Political Considerations
As with economic policy considerations, considerations of political
policy ostensibly are outside the realm of the Court's inquiry but cer-
tainly are central to a determination of the eventual direction of Com-
mon Market policy regarding concentration. Within the EEC, Mem-
ber States often have views differing from each other or from the com-
mission regarding the benefits and detriments of large concentrations
and multinational corporations. For example, the growth of multina-
tional corporations affects important areas of economic and political
concern such as balance of payments, currency stability and interna-
tional economic relations, over which both the EEC and the Member
State wherein the multinational is located may be jealous of their super-
visory interests.
The relations between foreign companies and a host country often
comprise a significant part of that country's foreign relations. Control
of foreign investment and multinational expansion of enterprises may
appear vital to maintenance of the host country's economic policy and,
arguably, to its national security as well. On the other hand, one of
the rationales of the Common Market is that many problems, including
many related to investment and competition, are more amenable to reg-
ulation by a supranational organization such as the EEC then by frag-
mented national units. Additionally, many national politicians and in-
stitutions may be willing to surrender some control to the EEC rather
than face the dilemmas and conflicting political pressures regarding its
exercise. Many of these same conflicts surround attempts to control
large intranational enterprises. It is probable that much of the debate
that will occur in the council on the commission's proposed regulation"
will center on what is the appropriate balance of supervisory power for
competition, not only as between the Member States and the EEC
but as between the various institutions within the EEC structure.
94. At present, the United States and the Organization for Economic Co-Opera-
tion and Development (OCED) are both studying the problems caused by multina-
tional corporations.
The EEC Commission is conducting a large study of concentration to discover
the present situation, the causes, effects and "economic laws" relating to concentrations,
and to make suggestions for future practice. The commission is also studying national
and international concentration on a sector by sector basis. Prior Notification of Merg-
ers?, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct., 1972.
95. See text accompanying notes 129-47 infra.
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Political policy considerations go far beyond this to the whole
realm of international power relationships. When a foreign enterprise
purchases a company in a Common Market country, there is an initial
capital inflow into the Common Market as payment for that company.
Not only do future profits flow out of the Common Market, but control
over that company, its labor and operations shifts away from the EEC.
Such control constitutes an important EEC resource. Often invest-
ment concentrates in commercial areas strategic to the economic func-
tioning and development of a country. In particular these include areas
such as high technology industries, computer science, electronics and
corporate management, in which American or Japanese skills and tech-
nology may be better developed than their European counterparts.
Tales of "economic imperialism" are legion, a recent and extreme
example being the now well-publicized attempts of the International
Telephone and Telegraph Company to use its formidable economic and
political power to influence the Chilean elections. It is a common sug-
gestion that, whether from a desire to curry political favor at home or
merely as a result of corporate views unconsciously parallel with those
of the home state government, the exercise of control from abroad often
reflects home state foreign policy interests even when they are at vari-
ance with the interests of the country wherein the investment is located.
On the other hand, those outside the Common Market have
feared discrimination against their companies in Europe. There is con-
cern that some national administrators and bureaucrats in the commis-
sion may have developed a resentment for the American presence in
Europe, not only as it influences politics and commerce but also as
it affects the culture and general styles of living. It is conceivable that
such feelings may have influenced the decision of the commission to
initiate proceedings against the acquisition of TDV. Regardless of the
strength of any such bias, it should be noted that prior to these pro-
ceedings the commission had commenced proceedings under Article 86
against an acquisition involving only Common Market interests; the ac-
quisition was abandoned, however, and no decision was issued. 96
Strict control of acquisitions by American firms in Europe might
lead those firms to choose expansion by internal growth. Without fur-
ther elaboration, it is suggested that the desirability of such a develop-
ment will depend on the facts of each individual case. Strict regulation
of acquisitions may preserve the integrity of each existing competitor
but will dampen business activity by making many mergers prohibitive.
96. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 22, at 222-23.
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It is also possible that foreign firms might reduce their activities in the
Common Market although this appears unlikely. Regulation of foreign
investment in the Common Market is still comparatively moderate; in
many respects it is less stringent than the combination of antitrust, con-
sumer protection, industrial and commercial regulations encountered in
the United States, the home of many multinational corporations. Ad-
ditionally, multinational expansion and foreign investment are increas-
ing in many countries, particularly developing countries which have reg-
ulatory controls far greater than those in the EEC yet offer less de-
veloped markets and legal protection for foreign investment. If fears
of discrimination increase, it would be detrimental to important interna-
tional events such as the G.A.T.T. discussions, the negotiations on tariff
adjustments resulting from the accession of three countries to the
EEC, the discussions on the United States proposal for a new At-
lantic Charter which would include Japan and efforts at cooperative
resolutions of recent international monetary and energy problems.
Many of the above policy considerations arose in the Continental
Can case. Had the original plan proceeded unhindered, the largest pro-
ducers of metal containers in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and
the Benelux countries would have been tied together under the 51 per-
cent control of an American firm by bonds much stronger than the li-
censing agreements which formerly tied each of them to Continental.
Yet Continental did nothing inherently wrong. In such a situation,
there appears to be no possible compromise of conflicting values which
would not have exposed the Court to justifiable charges of making pol-
icy, ignoring commercial realities or playing at economics and politics.
The outcome of the case suggests that prejudice against non-European
firms did not affect the decision. The impact on the Court's decision of
economic and political factors other than prejudice is unclear; however,
they certainly will remain crucial factors, influencing not only the eco-
nomic environment and control of mergers, concentration and invest-
ment but also future competition policy generally.
Impact of the Continental Can Case on Article 86
Either one can hold the power down to a level one thinks is ade-
quately curbed by competition, or one can introduce some kind
of control that prevents the power from being used in ways one
does not like. 97
Before the Continental Can judgment it was widely assumed that
Article 86 reflected the latter alternative. Continental Can must be
97. Statement of Corwin Edwards cited in JOLIET, supra note 38, at 127.
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examined now to determine just how much that position has altered
and to predict how any new position might be reflected in future cases
or regulations. This will be done by review of the impact of the
Court's teleological reasoning, by examination of the new interpretation
of the relationship between Articles 85 and 86, and, for perspective,
by re-examination of the traditional comparison of EEC law with
United States law. From this base, emerging trends and the proposed
regulation can best be discussed. It should be noted that the changes
caused by Continental Can are important not only for their effect on
that regulation but also for the application of Articles 85 and 86 to
concentrations until the regulation is adopted and for the use of Article
86 in situations not involving concentrations.
The Impact of the Teleological Reasoning Employed by the Court
A useful key for interpreting the Court's reasoning can be found
in the following passage from the judgment:
If Article 86 of the EEC Treaty is so construed [with regard to Ar-
ticle 3(f)] the strengthening of the position held by one enter-
prise can be an abuse and prohibited under Article 86 of the
Treaty regardless of the methods or means used to attain it, pro-
vided it has the effects described above.08
By this emphasis on effect the Court is able to avoid becoming mired
in many arguments and distinctions previously thought to be relevant.
These issues99 include questions as to (a) the need for a causal link
between the dominant position and the effect produced; (b) distinc-
tions between effects caused by direct market behavior and those caused
by alteration of industrial structure, and (c) the need for some element
of moral wrong. These matters relate not to the substance of the effect
but to how that effect was produced and therefore are immaterial.
One result of holding these issues immaterial is that many argu-
ments for avoiding competition policy objectives are eliminated. It is
relatively easy for an enterprise to be able to achieve an economic goal
by various methods. The choice among methods is often exercised to
enable the enterprise to take advantage of or to comply with corpora-
tion or tax laws. A prohibition of abuse would be meaningless if it
did not impose sanction on all methods of causing the undesired effect.
The lack of a requirement of a causal link means that Article 86 can
be applied in a wider variety of situations than otherwise and without
the need to debate issues of proximate cause. Similarly,. adoption of
98. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8300.
99. See text accompanying notes 71-87 supra.
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the concept of "enterprise entity"'100 also makes Article 86 more com-
prehensive because it increases the number and locations of enterprises
covered by the statute. The irrelevance of the second issue allows for
the practical reality that there is a spectrum of possible forms for con-
centration, many of which, such as the joint venture, could be classified
just as easily as alteration of market structure as direct market behavior.
The absence of a question regarding the moral quality of the activity
keeps the analysis within the realms of economics and law in which
the issues are somewhat more manageable.
The judgment did not draw a distinction between internal and ex-
ternal growth. Although the Court decided only the applicability of
Article 86 to cases where a dominant position was extended by merger,
a form of external growth, the decision might have implications for re-
lated situations. Before the Court, Dr. Gleiss effectively illustrated the
first of these related situations. If it is abusive to extend a dominant
position by acquisition of another company, he asked, then may it also
be abusive to achieve a similar increase in market power by the more
internal activities of purchasing or constructing another factory or even
by renting more production equipment?' His argument is certainly
well taken because it points out that there is a whole range of activity
which could be considered either external or internal. A consistent ap-
plication of Article 86 with emphasis on the effect produced appears
to require that this distinction be considered as irrelevant as the distinc-
tions between direct market behavior and activity affecting industrial
structure. It may well be that on the basis of this reasoning future
judgments will hold that in some situations growth due to internal ac-
tivity may be abusive. 10 2 A significant factual difference between in-
ternal activity and horizontal merger is that the latter involves the direct
elimination of a competitor. Regardless, the criterion of judgment in
either situation evidently will be whether on the facts the extension of
a dominant position amounts to a "distortion" of competition.
Apparently the Court's reasoning would permit application of Ar-
ticle 86 even to the somewhat unusual situation in which a dominant
firm, probably in a declining market, is doing nothing internally or ex-
ternally to expand, yet nonetheless is faced with an increasing relative
market share. Application of Article 86 to the mere continuance of
a dominant position where that mere continuance could result in a dis-
100. See note 22 supra.
101. Pleadings, supra note 73, at 15.
102. FORTUNE, Aug. 1973, at 77. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
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tortion of competition certainly would raise problems of fashioning an
appropriate remedy. An order for the enterprise to divide into two
or more separate firms appears to be harsh and unfair. An order to
reduce prices to stimulate demand might drive remaining competitors
out of business; an order to increase prices, however, could secure
monopoly profits for the dominant enterprise, reduce demand and ac-
centuate the decline in the industry. These last two remedies lead to
the same effects respectively if a dominant enterprise had engaged in
cut-throat pricing 03 or had limited its production to the prejudice of
consumers. 1°4 It is submitted that these problems are due less to the
existence of a dominant enterprise than to an excess of supply over
demand. Therefore, remedies should not be directed at limiting the
dominant firm but rather at correcting the underlying imbalance in the
market.
Two other situations for which Continental Can could have impli-
cations are those of a nondominant firm or firms expanding either by
external growth such as merger or by internal growth. These situations
would include most conglomerate and vertical mergers. There seems
to be little reason to feel that either could fall within the present inter-
pretation of Article 86; the required dominant position is not present.
Continental Can may have implications for these situations by encour-
aging the implementation of a new regulation which may cover them.
In these two situations there remain the same doubts discussed above
as to the utility of the distinction between internal and external growth.
It now appears that an entirely different formulation is needed to
examine the Common Market position regarding concentrations and
combinations. The Court's reasoning merges the formerly separate
concepts of limiting the attainable level of power and of merely control-
ling disapproved use of that power. This is done by reasoning that
an extension of dominant position may also be regarded as use of exist-
ing power as a foundation for increased dominance in the future. In
effect, this is the reasoning which would have been applied in Contin-
ental Can had the Court agreed with the commission's interpretation
of the facts. In such a situation, limitation of the extent of Continen-
tal's power also would have been a limitation on their use of that
power.
The Court provided the new formulation for examining merger
situations with its instruction that Article 3(f) concepts are to be em-
103. Prohibited by Article 86A. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
104. Prohibited by Article 86B. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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phasized. This formulation, however, does not answer many practical
questions. Dominant enterprises still do not know whether internal
expansion which increases dominance is as suspect as increases in domi-
nance achieved by acquisition or merger. Such a position, which is
implied by the Court, could, if enforced, dampen such formerly re-
spected business activities as the building of new plants and equipment
or the modernizing of production facilities. Improvements in efficiency
which could lead to lower prices might be discouraged. Dr. Willy
Schlieder, Director-General for Competition in the Common Market,
takes a strict view on this matter.
In his view the court held that if a company has a dominant mar-
ket position, it cannot improve its position by any means whatever.
"If you have a dominant position," says Schlieder, "that is, if your
competition depends on you for their behavior, you shouldn't en-
large your dominant position by any means." Schlieder himself
is uncertain whether the decision means that a large company may
not become bigger or increase its market share through internal
growth.10 5
Dominant enterprises also do not know how to evaluate various
forms of growth with regard to the antitrust policy of the Common Mar-
ket. An enterprise dominant in one area for one product may want
to expand its marketing of that product into other geographic areas
in which it may become dominant or in which it already possesses
dominance for some other, possibly related, product. An enterprise
which wants to expand its product line to include possible substitutes
for the product in which it enjoys dominance will find it hard to deter-
mine when a change in its product constitutes an impermissible expan-
sion of a dominant position. This will be Continental's position if it
significantly expands its market share for forms of packaging other than
light metal containers for meat or fish products or if it tries to expand
the use of light metal containers for products other than fish or meat
such as beer, milk, or motor oil.
Although the uncertainties appear to be infinite, it is submitted
that the Continental Can case has not increased the uncertainties in
business management but merely has swapped existing doubts about
"abuse" for new ones regarding both "distortion" and "competition."
The Court does give some guidance regarding interpretation of these
terms:
Thus, abusive conduct could be present where an enterprise in a
dominant position strengthens that position to the point where the
degree of domination achieved substantially hampers competition,
105. FORTUNE, Aug. 1973, at 77.
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so that only enterprises which in their market conduct are de-
pendent on the dominant enterprise would remain on the market.
It can, in fact, aside from any fault, be considered an abuse if one
enterprise acquires a dominant position to the point that the ob-
jectives of the Treaty are circumvented through a substantial al-
teration of the supply situation, so that the consumer's freedom of
action on the market is seriously jeopardized .... 101
These are, of course, general statements and businessmen will have
to wait for future cases and regulations to clarify the concepts in Arti-
cles 86 and 3(0. Some clarification will probably result from the
Court's requirement that the commission present a fuller structural an-
alysis of the facts than it did in Continental Can.10 7  Additionally, in
the process of placing Article 3(0 in the forefront of competition pol-
icy, the Court has resolved many important issues by minimizing dis-
tinctions formerly thought to be relevant. The elimination of these
questions greatly simplifies the analysis required under Article 86.
Reinterpretation of the Relationship Between Articles 85 and 86
One impact of Continental Can which may prove to be of major
significance in most areas of competition policy other than merger con-
trol is the Court's reinterpretation of the relationship between Articles
85 and 86. The effects on competition policy generally are hard to
predict at this early stage and are outside the scope of this paper. It
may be academic now to discuss the application of Article 85 to merger
policy in light of the Concentration Memorandum of 1965.108 There
the commission declared that Article 85 would not apply to mergers.
Complete reversal of that position by the commission is unlikely, partic-
ularly since the question of merger control can now be handled in other
ways. Yet it does appear that many of the commission's reasons for
declaring Article 85 inapplicable to mergers have been eroded since
1965. Experience in the United Kingdom shows that a priori evalua-
tion of prospective mergers is possible although the success of the
United Kingdom's procedure in preventing undesirable mergers is, of
course, debatable. 109 With such a priori evaluation, perhaps by negative
106. Court Decision, supra note 10, at 8300-01.
107. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra. It should be noted that the com-
mission has been criticized in the past for not doing this kind of structural analysis.
V. Korah, The Control of Mergers under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty: Continental
Can, 26 CUMIENT Lao. PROB. 82 (1973); JOLIET, supra note 38.
108. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
109. See Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965. Owen cites the statement of Sir
Geoffrey Howe, Minister of State at the Department of Trade and Industry to the
effect that since 1965 over 700 mergers have been examined by that Department. It
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clearance 1 ' or prior notification procedures, the nullity sanction of Ar-
ticle 85(2)... would no longer be such a hindrance. Most completed
mergers would not face the prospect of being declared void because
they would have been cleared before the agreement was closed. The
commission could be bound by regulation not to withdraw an 85
(3)112 exemption given to a merger. Similarly, the requirement in Ar-
ticle 85(3) that the restriction be indispensible for attaining the objec-
tives of that article could be applied with sufficient leniency to account
for commercial necessities. The application of Article 86 to mergers in-
volving a dominant position would relieve most of the imbalance which
could have arisen from the inapplicability of Article 85 to cases in
which concerted action was lacking. The conjoint application of Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 to concentrations would actually lead to the most bal-
anced enforcement of competition policy. Between them these articles
cover most of the undesired situations regardless of how they were
caused. The only situation not covered where both concerted action
and dominant position are lacking, would seldom present a problem." 3
This is in keeping with the reasoning of Continental Can that Ar-
ticles 85 and 86 do not operate in individual vacuums but rather form
a comprehensive integrated framework for implementing the objectives
of Articles 2 and 3 (f)."' If there is a reversal of the policy regard-
ing application of Article 85 to concentrations, quite possibly it will
be based on this reasoning. Such a reversal probably would not be
a declaration but rather would be reflected in a regulation comprehen-
sive enough to deal with all forms of concentration and combination
and not merely mergers.
Impact of the Court's Reasoning in Areas Other Than Competition Policy
Although at this point it is sheer speculation, one aspect of the
Court's judgment has the potential of overshadowing the others in sig-
appears, however, that only about 2 percent of these were referred to the Monopolies
Commission for further investigation. Owen, Mergers: Commercial Logic and Public
Interest, The Financial Times (London), Nov. 23, 1972.
For a discussion of a priori evaluation of mergers see V. KoRAH, MONOPOLIES
AND RESTRICTiVE PRACTICEs 72 (1968).
110. See note 85 supra.
111. Article 85(2) reads: "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to
this article shall be automatically void." 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2031, at 1657.
See note 2 supra.
112. See text of Article 85(3) in note 86 supra.
113. Some of these arguments are covered in Canellos & Silber, supra note 42,
at 152-59; Markert, supra note 6, at 47-49; and Mestmicher II, supra note 55, at 60-61.
114. See text cited in note 49 and text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
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nificance. This is the possibility that just as the Court closely examined
the objectives of Articles 2 and 3(f) to determine the scope of Articles
85 and 86, so it could also use the other treaty objectives set out in
Articles 2 through 7115 to interpret the scope of all the other articles
115. Articles 2-7 of the Rome Treaty read as follows:
Article 2
"The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a contin-
uous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
Article 3
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall in-
dude, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quan-
titative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other meas-
ures having equivalent effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commer-
cial policy towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of move-
ment for persons, services and capital;
(d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture;
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market
is not distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member
States can be coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments
remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for
the proper functioning of the common market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment
opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard
of living;
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic
expansion of the Community by opening up fresh resources;
(k) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase
trade and to promote jointly economic and social development.
Article 4





-a COURT OF JUSTICE.
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty.
2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and Social
Committee acting in an advisory capacity.
Article 5
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achieve-
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implementing these objectives. If a teleological approach was appro-
priate for Continental Can, there is no reason why it should not also
be appropriate in future cases whether ot not they deal with competi-
tion policy.
In Continental Can, Articles 2 and 3 (f) were used to resolve a
dispute as to whether Article 86 could be applied in a situation not
explicitly covered by the statute. This case, in combination with Articles
2 and 3(f), is being used to urge legislation more comprehensive than
was previously thought to be attainable. As will be seen, the proposed
regulation covers situations not even implied in Articles 85 and 86.
Perhaps in fields such as transport, labor and tariff policy, the basic
principles of the Rome Treaty similarly will be used to resolve disputes.
Because Articles 2 through 7 are broadly worded, application of these
principles often would allow liberal statutory interpretations and com-
prehensive regulations. By this method the Court's reasoning could
be used as an instrument by which the scope of EEC activity is greatly
expanded. This development may be good or bad depending on how,
if at all, this instrument is used. Evaluation also depends on personal
judgments regarding how much power the EEC institutions in general
and the Court in particular should have. It is predictable that the
Court annd commission will not be able to absorb significant new pow-
ers into the Rome Treaty without considerable resistance from Member
States. This will be true especially in areas such as those connected
with foreign relations where the exercise of power by the community
may diminish the power exercisable by the individual Member States."'
ment of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty.
Article 6
1. Member States shall, in close cooperation with the institutions of the Com-
munity, coordinate their respective economic policies to the extent necessary to attain
the objectives of this Treaty.
2. The institutions of the Community shall take care not to prejudice the internal
and external financial stability of the Member States.
Article 7
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any spe-
cial provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall
be prohibited.
The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, adopt, by a qualified majority, rules designed to prohibit such discrimina-
tion." 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ff 165-191, at 210-23. See note 2 supra.
116. Professor Mathijsen of the University of Nijmegen observed: "[In the
ENEL case in which the Court of Justice established that the Member States had re-
stricted their sovereign rights and created a body of law applicable to both the Member
States and their citizens, the Court concluded 'that the integration into the law of each
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
February 1974] COMMON MARKET ANTJTRUST 507
It should be expected, therefore, that de facto expansion of the treaty
in this matter will be a slow process.
Comparison of EEC and U.S. Laws
Because the judgment in Continental Can brings structural effects
within the purview of Article 86, it has been asserted that this case
brings control of dominant firms in the EEC very close to its Ameri-
can counterpart in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.11r Professor Joliet
convincingly asserts that the concepts of dominant position in EEC
competition law and of monopoly power in American law are function-
ally equivalent concepts.118  Accepting this as valid, and if it is also
true that "European antitrust law is becoming the same ballgame as
in the United States,"" 9 then United States law and developments possi-
bly can be examined to predict long-run trends in European law.
Rather than make this traditional comparison, which has been done
well elsewhere, 20 some similarities and differences as they appear in
the light of Continental Can will be made to temper any predictions
by analogy.
It is valid to state that Continental Can adds a structural emphasis
to Article 86 similar to that often applied in U.S. antitrust cases. In
both systems the structure of a given market is analyzed to some
degree to determine whether or not an enterprise has caused that struc-
ture to vary impermissibly from the vaguely defined ideal condition of
"normal competition." Both systems also monitor the market activities
Member State of provisions of Community origin and more particularly the wording
and the spirit of the treaty have as a corollary the impossibility for the Member States
to give preference over a legal order they accepted on a reciprocity basis, to a subse-
quent unilateral (national) measure; the latter cannot indeed be opposed to this legal
order, since the binding force of Community law may not vary from one State to an-
other because of subsequent national legislation without jeopardizing the implementa-
tion of the treaty objectives."' P. MAThIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COmMUNrTy
L.&w 10-11 (1972). See also Commission of European Communities v. Council of
the European Communities, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8134, at 7525.
117. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
118. See generally JOLIET, supra note 38.
119. Trust-Busting in the Common Market, NEwswEK, Mar. 5, 1973, at 45 (Int'I
ed.).
120. See COMMON MARKET AND AamEwcmr ANrrraus (J. Rahl ed. 1970);
JOLIET, supra note 38.
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of enterprises not only by antitrust laws but also by specific social and
industrial regulations. It would be better, therefore, to view American
and European antitrust as similar because they both integrate structural
and behavioral emphases to cover a spectrum of economic activity. One
of the major impacts of Continental Can is that it provides this balance
in EEC law. It now would be fair to say that Articles 85 and 86
supplement each other in the same way as do Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.
In examining American law, consideration should be given to the
Sherman Act, which is most often said to present the counterparts to
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, and to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,' 2 ' which applies to a wider range of mergers than does the Sherman
Act. Equal consideration should be given to other sections of the
Clayton Act which cover activities such as tying and economic dis-
crimination and to the Federal Trade Commission Act, which is the
federal "unfair competition" statute'22 and often can cover situations
also within the scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Additionally,
legislation governing industries, such as transport and banking, and
activities, such as lending, advertising and labor relations, federal and
state tax laws, and state corporate, antitrust and unfair competition
statutes also influence patterns of competition and legal development.
It is submitted that only in its legal environment can the scope of the
Sherman Act or of the other laws mentioned be understood because
this environment determines which problems arise, which legal theories
lawyers will choose to emphasize and, consequently, which practical
and theoretical developments will occur. To say, therefore, that the
Common Market has adopted in the Continental Can case Section 2
of the Sherman Act is a meaningless statement because that act operates
only in a context which Europe has not adopted.
It may be argued, of course, that the Common Market has ap-
proximated the American legal environment by the broad scope of Arti-
cle 85 and now of Article 86 as well. There is some truth to this
contention if it is not pushed too far. Both the Common Market and
121. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) states in relevant part: "No cor-
poration shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or any
other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corpora-
tions engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
try, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock
by voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly."
122. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
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the United States seek to control the same sorts of anticompetitive ac-
tivities, but neither makes the large size of an enterprise illegal per se.
The practical controls on oligopoly are similar in effect. 123 In both it
may be argued that dominant enterprises must be careful not to take
advantage of too many of the available opportunities for growth. They
may be neither so inefficient that prices are unnecessarily high nor so
efficient that low prices hurt competition or that high prices give mo-
nopoly profits. Consequently, in both Europe and the United States,
corporate directors have a difficult time reconciling shareholders' de-
mands for growth and profit with governmental demands for restraint.
These differences are crucial when American law is used to predict
developments in the Common Market. The concept implicit in the Ar-
ticle 86 phrase "may affect trade between Member States" is far more
limited than the American concept requiring an effect on interstate
commerce. The American concept is construed so broadly now as to
be virtually meaningless as a practical limitation on the application of
federal antitrust legislation. Consequently, the American market is
much more unified than the Common Market by its competition regula-
tion and less burden need be placed on regulation by individual states.
American law has also abandoned the "Rule of Reason" as used
in EEC law especially in the application of Article 85(1) (c) and
the granting of group exemptions.124  United States law accepts the
utility of per se proscriptions in a few situations such as price fixing.
In other situations, if the restriction is shown, neither reasonableness
nor social utility can be an excuse. It should be noted, however, that
in the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 25 and in individual
rulings and policy statements by the Federal Trade Commission, the
United States has procedures which, depending on how they are used,
may have an effect similar to group exemptions and negative clear-
ances.
126
123. "In practice, therefore, the situation [under Art. 86] is not too different from
that under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which does not appear to be properly ap-
plicable to 'oligopoly' acquired by non-related corporations unless there is some element
of 'combining or conspiring to monopolize." OBERDORFER, GLEISS & HIRSCH, COM-
MON MARKET CARTEL LAW 108 (2d ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). For the applica-
tion of Article 86 to oligopolies see Re The European Sugar Cartel, 12 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. D65 (1973).
124. See R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUTs LAW (1967).
125. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 4230
(1968).
126. Canellos & Silber, supra note 42, at 142.
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Although it is true that in both systems, merely a showing of a
likelihood of reduced competition is sufficient to invoke legal sanctions,
significant differences remain. In the United States the required show-
ing is much easier to make than in the EEC where, because of Con-
tinental Can, a much fuller analysis of market structure is required. En-
forcement in the United States is also likely to be stronger than in the
Common Market because of the treble damage incentive to enforcement
by private civil suit. 12 7 Although seldom applied, criminal sanctions
also may be imposed for violations of the Sherman Act. This is im-
portant not only because it allows a government prosecution to pro-
vide a foundation for future private suits but also because it shows
the traditional U.S. bias against economic concentration.
In the United States antitrust was originally a political doctrine
arising from fear of the political power which so often accompanies
the economic leverage available to large concentrations. Europe has
not had experience comparable to that of the United States with trusts
and concentrations and, therefore, has less innate bias against them.
Control of oligopoly also reflects these historical differences. Economic
theories of oligopoly had not been developed when most of the United
States' antitrust statutes were enacted. Oligopolies were a major factor
in the U.S. economy by the time the problem was recognized and even
now oligopoly control under section 2 of the Sherman Act rests on the
tenuous theory of implied conspiracy.' 28  The reverse was the situation
in Europe at the time of the formation of the EEC and, consequently,
it can be seen from the wording of the EEC statutes that they do
not need to be so strained to cover activities of oligopolists.
The contrast of EEC and U.S. antitrust has been necessary to
show that they are not becoming the "same ballgame." Rather, the
impact of Continental Can has been to foster in EEC law a flexibility
already present in U.S. antitrust law. Some general comparison of the
two systems is indeed useful, particularly for understanding common
problems such as those reflected in the growth of multinational corpora-
tions. However, the roots, development, present emphasis and re-
spective economies of the two systems still present significant differ-
ences which should cast suspicion on specific predictions for EEC
legal developments made by analogy to the more experienced United
States system.
127. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
128. See note 120 supra.
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The Proposed Regulations
A major theme of this paper is that the Continental Can case
has given the institutions of the Common Market quite -a flexible tool
for the direction and implementation of policy regarding multinationals
and mergers. The direction of the decision obviously helps, rather than
hinders, broader control of concentrations and it is nearly a carte
blanche regarding the fashion and extent of that control. Many of the
attendant uncertainties of this carte blanche will be relieved by the pro-
posed Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertak-
ings.32
9
In its proposal to the Council of Ministers, the commission has
tried to take as full advantage of the Continental Can decision as intra-
community politics will allow. 130 The proposed regulation is based
both on Article 235 and on Article 87.131 It is designed to cover all
agreements, not just mergers, in which an enterprise will lose economic
independence.L32  Any transaction involving enterprises with aggregate
turnover greater than 200 million units of account and enjoying a mar-
ket share greater than 25 percent for the goods or services concerned
is declared to be incompatible with the Common Market 33 if it gives
those enterprises "[t]he power to hinder effective competition . . .,.
It establishes a system of prior notification to the commission of
agreements involving enterprises with combined sales larger than one
billion units'"3 of account and in which the acquired enterprise has an
annual turnover greater than thirty million units of account. The
agreement may not be put into effect within three months of notifica-
tion.' 3 6  If the commission does not initiate proceedings within that
time, the agreement may proceed as planned.' 3 7 If it does initiate pro-
129. 2 CCH Comm. Mr. REP. 9586, at 9302-04 [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Regulation].
130. Unlike commission members, who act for the entire community, ministers
to the council are directed to pursue the interests of their respective states. Because
the council acts as a brake on commission activities which tend to strengthen the Com-
mon Market at the expense of the individual states, the commission must take a mod-
erate stance in its proposals to the council if it seriously seeks approval. The Council
of Ministers failed to consider the proposed regulation on its merits and referred it
to a committee. The Financial Times (London), Jan. 15, 1974.
131. Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, at 9302.
132. Id. at 9303 (Article 1.1).
133. Id. at 9303-2 (Article 2).
134. Id. at 9303 (Article 1.1).
135. A European Unit of Account is the equivalent of one 1960 U.S. dollar or
0.88867088 grams of fine gold.
136. Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, at 9303-3 (Article 6.2).
137. Id. (Article 6.4).
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ceedings, the commission would be required to reach a final decision
within nine months. 3 ' Sanctions are established for failure to comply
with the provisions of the proposed regulation. 139
All these elements are significant and controversial. They give
the first major example of how the Continental Can case can act as
a charter for stricter competition policy in the Common Market. Be-
cause Continental Can held control of horizontal mergers to be within
the scope of Articles 85 and 86, the requirement for the use of Article
87 to control horizontal mergers is met. 140 The commission has also
decided to use Article 235 as a basis for the regulation because it is
doubtful whether all that the commission wanted to include within its
regulation falls within the scope of Article 86, even as expanded by
the Continental Can case. The commission was faced with the choice
of limiting the scope of its regulation and confining it to Article 87,
which requires approval by a majority of the council, or of seeking a
broader regulation under Article 235 which requires the two-thirds ma-
jority approval of the council to add new powers not already provided
by the treaty. 4' The commission wanted to control conglomerate and
vertical mergers as well as horizontal ones. To date, all definitions
of dominant position have required dominance in a particular geo-
graphic and product market. It would be difficult to show expansion
of a dominant position for most vertical and conglomerate mergers.
There is also some doubt as to how nonmerger forms of concentration
would be covered under Articles 85 and 86 so as to be open to cov-
erage in a regulation based solely on Article 87. In order to avoid
these peripheral legal battles and yet get the comprehensive regulation
it seeks, the commission chose to proceed under Article 235 as well
as under Article 87.
The scope of the proposed regulation is another matter of contro-
versy. In essence, almost all control of concentration and combination
in Articles 85 and 86 is removed from these articles and placed in the
138. Id. at 9303-5 (Article 17.1).
139. Id. at 9303-5 (Article 13).
140. Article 87(1) of the Rome Treaty reads: "Within three years of the entry
into force of this Treaty the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations
or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86." 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 2201, at 1697. See note 2 supra.
141. The different voting requirements of the two articles may have little practi-
cal significance in light of the "Luxembourg Agreement" of 1966 which stipulates that
majority voting is not to be used against the important interests of a dissenting Mem-
ber State. P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 134-35 (1972).
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regulation.142 From one point of view this appears perfectly proper.
Such control arguably is within the treaty and serves to implement the
objectives of Articles 2 and 3 (f). At the same time it is also arguable
that for such a restructuring of the treaty an amendment under Article
236 is required. The regulation may be perceived as pre-empting Arti-
cles 85 and 86 and making them "dead-letter" in this area. The argu-
ment for an amendment especially appears to have merit in light of the
three month limit given the commission to respond to notification of an
agreement. The essence of this argument is that by preventing the
commission from complaining after three months, the commission's
powers are being curtailed. Article 235 allows only for the provision
of additional powers, not for the curtailment of existing ones.
Article 235 also allows only for the addition of powers requisite
to achieve an aim of the community. It is doubtful whether conglom-
erate mergers not involving a dominant position involve sufficient dis-
tortion of competition to be covered by Article 3(f). It is difficult
to know how much distortion is required by that article. If indeed
there is not sufficient threat of distorted competition, then Article 3(f)
is not involved and the power the commission seeks in order to
control these mergers is outside the legislative scope of Article 235.
It should be noted in support of an extra-treaty approach that Article
220 provides instruction for member states to enter any necessary nego-
tiations with each other regarding the "possibility" of international
mergers.
There are two counterarguments to these contentions that an
amendment is needed. The first is that community objectives are much
broader than the activities described in Article 3(f). These objectives
are mainly in Article 2 and are drafted so broadly that they apparently
permit legislation for almost any desired purpose. The second argu-
ment is that, viewed as a whole, the proposed regulation expands rather
than contracts the power of the commission.
To the extent that individual powers or limitations within the reg-
ulation must be examined individually, it is arguable that the three
month time limit does not curtail existing power but rather is only one
boundary on the new power to receive prior notification of agreements
which would be granted. The commission is not limited by a three
month time limit for objecting to agreements for which it does not re-
ceive notification. Both sides of this dispute have merit. It will there-
142. Of course, Article 85 would retain its vitality in cases dealing with concerted
action short of combination or concentration.
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fore probably be an important point for argument before the Council
of Ministers.
The entire concept of prior notification which the proposed regu-
lation tries to establish is controversial. Prior notification is a compro-
mise procedure. It is not as strict as an outright prohibition combined
with an opportunity to seek exemption. Nor is it as strict as a proce-
dure requiring not only prior notification but also prior and explicit
authorization of the proposed combination. On the other hand, there
are many situations in which secrecy or speed are required for success-
ful negotiation. Notification and delays for approval could frustrate
conclusion of such agreements. For this reason, and because mergers
often promote efficiency and competition, a system of granting limited
exemptions from a prohibition of further concentration would have been
foolish. The ECSC requires that mergers receive prior authorization
before they can proceed.'43 This would have been inappropriate to
the Common Market because the Common Market covers a much
broader range of economic activity than does the ECSC and most
concentration in industries other than coal and steel does not make it
more possible for a country to wage war. On the other hand, requiring
prior approval is certainly an easier method of enforcement than trying
to unwind complicated mergers once they have been completed. A
further advantage of prior notification is that it puts the initial burden
on the enterprise and not on the commission's rather thin staff of twenty
(as of August 1973) investigators.
Because it would be impractical both for the commission and for
businessmen to review all agreements, only those agreements must be
examined which involve enterprises with combined sales greater than
one billion units of account and in which the acquired enterprise has
turnover greater than thirty million units of account. These limits are
open to the criticism that they are too high. Although the commission
presently has the manpower only to review agreements of this size and
greater, the limits should have been set lower in anticipation of a time
when a larger number of agreements would receive full scrutiny. It
would have been easier to build limits into the proposed regulation
which actually reflect the needs of an effective competition policy rather
than to try to extend the limits later after the commission develops the
capacity to more fully utilize them. Lower limits would give the com-
mission extra flexibility to review selected smaller agreements and also
could be used as an argument for the need for a larger staff. Under
143. See text of Article 66 of the Paris Treaty in note 59 supra.
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the proposed regulation, the commission may still review the smaller
agreements when it learns of them, but as to these it will not have the
advantage of receiving prior notification. The arguments in favor of
the higher limits are that it would inconvenience businessmen to make
reports which may not be reviewed and that these high limits reflect
only the political compromises the commission has felt it necessary to
make to aid approval of its proposal.
The limits are stated both in terms of annual turnover and in terms
of market share. The turnover test can cover vertical and conglomerate
mergers in which the market share in a particular good or service is
not increased; and the market share test can include mergers among
specialized firms with only modest turnover but which have a strong
market position with respect to one particular product in a limited mar-
ket. One virtue of this combined test is that it minimizes the agoniz*ng
problems of determining the relevant market and the market share
which confront the Justice Department in the United States in applying
its 1968 merger guidelines.
The regulation is primarily concerned with situations in which one
undertaking acquires control of another undertaking. "Control" is
given a very broad definition including rights of management, rights
to use or liquidate assets in whole or in part, rights which make it possi-
ble to influence the internal structure of the organization and fiduciary
rights to vote shares or own assets.144 The breadth of the concept of
control makes the regulation comprehensive but consequently places a
larger burden on -the citizen who must determine if notification is re-
quired. 1
45
Review would be based on the criterion of the "power to hinder
effective competition." Essentially this would be a public interest in-
quiry without bias for or against agreements involving large enterprises.
In these particular respects it would be similar to the test used by the
Monopolies Commission in the United Kingdom.
Mrs. Korah of the University College, University of London has
criticized the use of the concept of the power to hinder effective compe-
tition as a damaging misdirection of emphasis. 46 She reasons that
this concept was borrowed from Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty and
that although it was appropriate to the coal and steel industries in which
144. Proposed Regulations, supra note 129, at 9302-2 (Article 2-2(1)-(5)).
145. Letter from Mrs. V. Korah to I. Hurwitz, Oct. 3, 1973.
146. Id.
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all the large enterprises had vertical links with suppliers or customers,
it may be inappropriate for application to the full spectrum of economic
activity. She marks a distinction between "hindering" or "impeding
competition" and "reducing competition." A horizontal merger in the
coal or steel industry in Europe would almost necessarily entail cutting
off a significant supplier or customer from a competitor; this would
be "impeding competition" and often could be characterized as preda-
tory conduct. In other industries, where the vertical links are ab-
sent, a horizontal merger might truly reduce competition without im-
peding it in the sense of denying to a competitor his suppliers or cus-
tomers. The definition of control used in the regulation should there-
fore take greater account of such situations where competition is re-
duced but not necessarily impeded, than does the following definition
from Section 1 of the proposed regulation:
The power to hinder effective competition shall be appraised
by reference in particular to the extent to which suppliers and
consumers have a possibility of choice, to the economic and fi-
nancial power of the undertakings concerned, to the structure of the
markets affected, and to supply and demand trends for the rele-
vant goods or services.14 7
For prescription, Mrs. Korah suggests that the regulation look
toward the power to set prices within a relatively broad range, without
competitive restraint, as the determining feature of impermissible mar-
ket control. Such a concept, unlike the concept of the power to hin-
der effective competition, would not require even by inference the exist-
ence of predatory conduct. The power to set prices within a broad
range looks more objectively at the structure of and the effects on the
market than does the concept used in the regulation and requires less
strain to account for situations where vertical links are not present. It
is also important that, even more than Section 1 of the proposed regula-
tion, the concept proposed by Mrs. Korah is fully within the spirit
and terms of the Court's decision in the Continental Can case. It is
submitted that this important yet omitted factor may still be examined
and given due emphasis within the terms of the proposed regulation.
In particular, examinations of the market structure and of the freedom
of choice and independence from market forces which a merger may
confer on the enterprises involved can lead to review of the same factors
Mrs. Korah would like to stress. Whether or not this will occur de-
pends on how strictly the proposed regulation, if passed, will be en-
forced.




The Continental Can case is a true landmark decision and has
significance far beyond its major holding that Article 86 applies to situ-
ations involving mergers. This significance is to be found in the effects
of the reasoning employed by the Court. Article 3(f) has been placed
in the forefront of competition policy and, with its policy-oriented ap-
proach, the Court has resolved the secondary yet serious problems of
whether or not application of Article 86 requires a causal link between
dominant position and abuse, direct market behavior and some quality
of moral wrong. While clearing away these old concerns, the Court
did not give guidance as to how Article 86 is to be applied and thereby
deferred in this matter to the other EEC institutions. The decision
did give some indirect aid here both by requiring that the commission
publish a fuller analysis of market structure in future cases and by em-
phasizing the need for a new regulation. What may be the most far-
reaching effects of the Court's use of teleological approach to treaty in-
terpretation are also the most unpredictable. The use of broadly worded
objectives to determine the scope of more specific statutes could make
interpretation of the Rome Treaty more expansive, more capable of
dealing with current problems and more unpredictable than it is at pres-
ent. The future significance of this could be felt not only in the area
of competition policy, but in all areas of EEC activity.
The EEC is a relatively new organization and it is important
that its initial steps in controlling concentrations be ones which will
not impede any needed future developments. The EEC will have
to be flexible in order to respond effectively to such developments as
the growth of multinational corporations and labor unions, the creation
of the Eurocompany and the Europatent, the increasingly reciprocal ef-
fects of monetary policy, competition policy and politics on one another,
and the incursion of state trading, particularly by Communist coun-
tries, into the Common Market. For such purposes the EEC will
need to develop a full range of tools. In the legal sphere, the Conti-
nental Can decision has contributed to this development.
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